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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Estate planning tends to focus on the distribution of 
assets and minimization of estate taxes upon an individual’s 
death. While these are important objectives, it is equally 
important for individuals to plan for the possibility of 
incompetence. Every state has an advance directive statue that 
allows individuals to direct their health care in the event they 
become incompetent. Written into a majority of these statutes 
is a “pregnancy exclusion” that limits the effectiveness of the 
advance directive when the patient is a pregnant woman. The 
effect of the exclusion differs from state to state, and there is 
virtually no public awareness that pregnancy exclusions exist.  
 This article analyzes the various pregnancy exclusions 
and explores whether a state’s interest in the fetus should take 
precedence over a woman’s right to refuse or terminate life 
support. 
___________________________________________________ 
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Siena College 
** Associate Professor of Quantitative Business Analysis, 
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II. THE HISTORY OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
 End-of-life issues have long been the cause of intense 
debate, focusing on questions concerning patient autonomy, 
quality of life, and the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatments. Advances in medical care and 
technology have blurred the boundaries between life and death 
and have challenged our expectations about how individuals 
should experience the end of life. In the 1960s the patient rights 
movement sought to free terminally ill patients from aggressive 
and ultimately futile life sustaining treatment.1 This resulted in 
the earliest form of advance directive, the living will. Living 
wills are designed to maintain the patient’s “voice” in medical 
decision making and empower individuals to dictate the terms 
of their own medical care at the end of life.2 
Initially it was the states, rather than the federal 
government, that moved to give legal force to living wills. 
However there was no uniformity in the state statutes, and they 
were hard to compare because they often appeared under 
ambiguous or unrelated titles. The Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act3 (URTIA) was drafted in 1985 by the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide guidance to 
the states. URTIA only applies to living wills. Living wills 
specify the individual’s wishes regarding life-prolonging 
treatment. URTIA does not apply to medical proxies, which 
allow individuals to name a surrogate to make medical 
decisions on their behalf. Furthermore, URTIA only applies 
when a person is in a terminal condition, not permanently 
comatose or in a vegetative state.  
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 URTIA states, “Life sustaining treatment must not be 
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an 
individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so 
long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of 
live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining 
treatment.”4 The original URTIA, adopted by the conference in 
1985, also included the phrase, “unless the declaration 
otherwise provides” but this phrase was removed and is not in 
the current provision.5 It was, therefore, the original intent of 
URTIA to limit statutory pregnancy exclusions only to those 
cases where a woman’s living will did not set forth her wishes 
in the event she was pregnant when her directions were to be 
carried out. While some states follow the current URTIA 
model, others do not; state statutes continue to lack uniformity. 
 
 After the landmark Supreme Court decision in Cruzan 
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health6 in 1990, the 
importance of advance directives became a national issue. 
Nancy Cruzan remained in a persistent vegetative state after 
suffering brain damage due to a lack of oxygen from a 
traumatic car accident, being kept alive by life-sustaining 
treatment. Her parents wished to discontinue the treatment, 
testifying that their daughter had previously expressed that she 
would not want to continue in such a state.7 The Court found 
that her parents had not met the required burden of proof of 
clear and convincing evidence, so the life-sustaining treatment 
could not be withdrawn.8  This was the first time the Court 
recognized that there exists a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment. In an effort to inform the 
public of their right to determine the course of their treatment 
even after they become incompetent, Congress passed the 
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990.9 This act requires 
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medical care providers receiving federal Medicare or Medicaid 
funds to inform all adult patients of their constitutional right to 
prepare an advance directive consisting of a living will and/or 
health care proxy. While the act helps to insure that people are 
informed of their right to create advance directives, it gives 
little guidance on the specific information that should be 
discussed with the patient, and completely fails to mention the 
existence of pregnancy exclusions. 
 
III.  PREGNANCY EXCLUSIONS 
 Currently thirty-one (31) states have pregnancy 
exclusions that limit the application of an advance directive if 
the patient is a pregnant woman.  These exclusions can be 
classified into two categories: 
1.  Statutes that automatically invalidate a woman’s advance 
directive if she is pregnant; and 
2.  Statutes that invalidate a pregnant woman’s advance 
directive only if the fetus is viable and/or if the fetus could 
develop to the point of a live birth. 
The policies of the remaining nineteen (19) states plus the 
District of Columbia can also be classified into two categories::  
1.  Statutes that allow women to write their own wishes 
regarding pregnancy into their advance directives, and 
guarantee that their instructions will be followed; and 
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2.  States were the law is silent with regard to advance 
directives and pregnancy.  
State laws make it clear that the rights of a pregnant woman 
vary greatly depending upon the state in which she is receiving 
treatment. 
AUTOMATIC INVALIDATION OF ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVE 
 Currently twelve (12) states have statutes that 
automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive if she is 
pregnant. These states are: Alabama10, Connecticut11, Idaho12, 
Indiana13, Kansas14, Michigan15, Missouri16, South Carolina17, 
Texas18, Utah19, Washington20, and Wisconsin21.  These states 
have the most restrictive pregnancy exclusion statutes. They 
require that pregnant woman be placed on or continue 
receiving live-sustaining treatment, regardless of the 
progression of the pregnancy, until she gives birth.  None of 
these statutes makes an exception for patients who will be in 
prolonged severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication, 
or those who will be physically harmed by continuing life-
sustaining treatment. It appears that these states place the 
interest of the unborn child above those of the mother. 
 Having an advance directive does not guarantee that a 
person’s wishes will be followed, but it makes allowing death 
less controversial. Both health care providers and family 
members are more likely to know exactly what the dying 
person wants. In general, even if there is no legal advance 
directive, life support can be removed if the health care team 
and family members all believe that it is the right course of 
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action for the dying person. This rule, however, does not apply 
if that person is a pregnant woman. 
 The New York Times published an article about 33-
year-old Marlise Munoz, who collapsed on her kitchen floor 
from what appeared to be a blood clot in her lungs. Marlise and 
her husband, Erick, were the parents of a toddler, and Marlise 
was 14 weeks pregnant with their second child at the time she 
collapsed.22  Doctors at the Fort Worth, Texas, hospital 
pronounced her brain dead and her family confirmed that she 
did not want her body to be kept alive by machines. Hospital 
officials argued, however, that state law required them to 
maintain life-sustaining treatment for a pregnant patient, and 
refused to discontinue treatment.  
 Marlise did not leave any written directives regarding 
end-of-life care. But Erick Muñoz had no doubt concerning 
what his wife wanted. They were both paramedics, and it was 
something they had talked about many times. Long before she 
was hospitalized her husband and parents had made Marlise a 
promise to honor her wishes, and they were determined to keep 
it.23 The family filed a lawsuit in the 96th District Court in 
Tarrant County, Texas, requesting that Marlise’s life support be 
removed. 
 At the time of the hearing Marlise was 22 weeks 
pregnant. The hospital acknowledged that she had been brain 
dead for eight weeks and the fetus she carried was not viable. 
The judge sided with the family, ordering the hospital to 
remove any artificial means of life support from Marlise.24  The 
hospital did not appeal, and stated that they had kept Marlise 
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on life support because they believed they were following the 
demands of the state statute.  
 Although the Court’s decision allowed the termination 
of Marlise’s life support, it did little to alter the interpretation 
or application of the Texas statute. The judge’s ruling was 
based on the fact that Marlise Munoz had been declared “brain 
dead” by the hospital.25 Since she was legally dead, she was no 
longer a “patient” whom the hospital was required to treat, and 
therefore the statue did not apply to her. If instead Marlise had 
been in a coma or persistent vegetative state, the hospital 
would have been required by law to continue life-sustaining 
treatment. 
INVALIDATION IF A LIVE BIRTH COULD RESULT 
 Nineteen (19) of the thirty-one (31) pregnancy 
exclusion states have statutes requiring that life-sustaining 
treatment be administered to a woman who is known to be 
pregnant if the fetus is viable and/or if the fetus could develop 
to the point of a live birth with the continuation of treatment: 
Alaska26, Arkansas27, Colorado28, Delaware29, Florida30, 
Georgia31, Illinois32, Iowa33, Kentucky34, Minnesota35, 
Montana36, Nebraska37, Nevada38, New Hampshire39, North 
Dakota40, Ohio41, Pennsylvania42, Rhode Island43, and South 
Dakota44.   
 These states could be further classified as follows: 
Twelve (12) states (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and South Dakota) require that it is “probable” 
or there is a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” that 
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continued treatment will result in a live birth. These states 
follow the URTIA model. The remaining seven (7) states 
(Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire 
and North Dakota) call for continuing treatment when the fetus 
is “viable”, or if it is “possible” that the fetus could develop to 
the point of a live birth.   
There are five (5) states (Kentucky, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota) that stipulate 
that an exception may be made if continuing treatment will be 
“physically harmful” to the woman or prolong “severe pain” 
which cannot be alleviated by medication.   
 While statutes falling into this category are less harsh 
then those that automatically invalidate a pregnant woman’s 
advance directive, her expressed wishes will still be ignored if 
a live birth could result. Also, as previously stated, only five 
(5) states consider the physical well-being of the mother when 
deciding whether to continue treatment; the remaining fourteen 
(14) states focus solely upon the fetus’s development and 
survival. 
 Turning back to the Munoz case, what if Marlise 
Munoz had not been declared brain dead?  Under Texas’s 
statute the continuation of life support would have been 
required. This is true even though the hospital acknowledged 
that the fetus was not viable and suffered from hydrocephalus 
(an abnormal accumulation of fluid in the cavities of the brain) 
as well as a possible heart problem and deformed lower 
extremities45. Regardless of the fact that in all probability the 
fetus would not have survived until birth, or would have died 
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shortly after birth, the Texas hospital would be required to 
continue life-sustaining treatment. This would not be true if 
Marlise was receiving treatment in one of the nineteen (19) 
states that considered whether a live birth was likely before 
continuing treatment. 
STATUTES THAT ALLOW WOMEN TO WRITE THEIR 
OWN WISHES REGARDING PREGNANCY 
 Five (5) states clearly allow women to write their 
wishes regarding pregnancy into their advance directives and 
guarantee their instructions will be followed: Arizona46 
Maryland47, New Jersey48, Oklahoma49 and Vermont50.  These 
statutes give a woman control over her body under all 
circumstances and protect her rights as a patient. Moreover, 
they inform women that a pregnancy could complicate the 
execution of their advance directive, a fact of which most 
women are unaware, and provide women with an avenue to 
assure that their wishes are followed.51 
 The language in the statutes passed in these five (5) 
states is explicit and expressly requires a woman to consider 
whether she would choose to continue life support to sustain an 
existing pregnancy, or terminate life support despite the 
pregnancy. 
STATES WERE THE LAW IS SILENT WITH REGARD TO 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND PREGNANCY 
 The remaining fourteen (14) states, plus the District of 
Columbia, do not address pregnancy in their advance directive 
statutes. These states are: California, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
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Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia 
and Wyoming. In these states it may be left to the courts to 
determine how to proceed. Since going through the court 
system takes significant time, a pregnant woman may be forced 
to endure prolonged treatment before the provisions of her 
advance directive can be carried out.52 Furthermore, the 
majority of these states have “conscience clauses,” which allow 
medical professionals or institutions to opt out of withholding 
life-sustaining treatment if the direction to withhold treatment 
is contrary to a policy of the medical professional or 
institution.53 
 
VI. STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
 In this section we will analyze the pregnancy laws by 
region. First let us introduce some abbreviations that will be 
used throughout this section: 
AIAD = Automatic Invalidation of Advance Directive – 12 states 
URTIA = Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act– 12 states 
VS = Viable Status – 7 states 
ILB = Invalidation if Live Birth can Result = URTIA and VS – 19 states 
CO = Clear Options – 5 states 
SIL = Law is Silent– 14 states 
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In Table 1 we see that the CO (Clear Options) statute 
for pregnancy issues only exists in 5 states.  In 10% of the 
states a woman can clearly articulate her wishes regarding 
pregnancy and these wishes will be guaranteed.  In contrast, we 
see that in Table 1 the laws that are in the group called SIL 
(Law is Silent) are the most common choice among the states.  
Hence in 28% of our states if a pregnancy issue comes to light 
then this matter will be settled in the court system.  
 A natural comparison to make with Pregnancy Laws is 
the Region that a state lies in.  It would be reasonable to 
assume the region might have impact on which law a state uses 
for pregnancy issues.  In Table 2 we see that in the Midwest 
region the majority of states, 5/12 = 41.7%, use AIAD; this 
means that in the Midwest region many of the states have 
statutes that automatically invalidate a woman’s advance 
directive if she is pregnant.  Additionally, if you add the 
Midwest and the Southern regions together then you have 2/3 = 
66% of the states that use AIAD.  Correspondingly, none of the 
states in the Midwest region follow the CO or SIL laws.  It is 
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Table 1: Pregnancy Laws
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also interesting to see that in the Northeast and Western region 
4/7 = 57.1% of these states use the SIL option and so any 
pregnancy issues will be decided by the court system.  These 
statistics point to a clear connection between region and views 
on pregnancy laws.    
Table 2 : Pregnancy Laws by Region 
 
Pregnancy Laws 
 
Region AIAD CO SIL URTIA VS 
Grand 
Total 
Midwest 5 0 0 3 4 12 
Northeast 1 2 3 2 1 9 
South 3 2 6 3 2 16 
West 3 1 5 4 0 13 
Total 12 5 14 12 7 50 
         
                                                                                                                                        
V. CONCLUSION 
 Why would states pass laws prohibiting the removal or 
withholding of life support from pregnant women? One reason is 
that states may be concerned that, when the woman indicated her 
wishes regarding life support, she did not anticipate that she 
would be pregnant at the time her wishes were to be carried out.  
 It is possible pregnancy exclusions were enacted to 
represent the actual intent of the woman had she thought about 
the situation in advance. Many rights and obligations arise by 
operation of law when individuals fail to set forth their wishes. 
Nevertheless this is a weak argument. States could easily include 
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language in their statutes requiring women to indicate their 
wishes in the event they are pregnant. Five states already have 
statues that do just that, thereby providing clear and convincing 
evidence of the woman’s wishes. If all states incorporated such 
language into their statues, pregnancy exclusions could be 
limited to those cases where the woman’s wishes cannot be 
adequately determined. 
 The Supreme Court recognized the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in Cruzan54. The right of anyone, pregnant 
or not, to refuse or terminate life support is a fundamental right. 
No matter how beneficial a treatment might be for the patient, 
she still has the right to refuse it. It follows that the government 
may not compel a person to receive unwanted medical treatment 
in order to promote the interests of another person, even if that 
“person” is the woman’s unborn child. Yet even when the 
Supreme Court recognizes the existence of a fundamental right, 
that right is not absolute.  
 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade55 and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey56 
recognize abortion as a fundamental right, but they also 
recognize that states have an interest in the potential life of the 
fetus. In Casey the Court held that the viability of the fetus is 
the point at which the states’ interest in potential life outweighs 
the rights of the woman. Once the fetus is viable abortion may 
be banned unless it is necessary for the preservation of the life 
or health of the mother. Prior to viability state laws restricting 
abortion cannot place a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.57  
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 Applying this standard to pregnancy exclusions, those 
that automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive if 
she is pregnant, regardless of the progression of the pregnancy, 
would appear to be unconstitutional. They place the state’s 
interest in a non-viable fetus above the woman’s fundamental 
right to refuse or terminate life support. But is this a proper 
comparison?  Do the standards established in abortion 
precedents apply? A live woman has an interest in terminating 
her pregnancy so she can continue living her life 
unencumbered, but a dying woman enjoys no similar interest.58 
It can be argued that a pregnant woman’s right to terminate life 
support, thereby terminating her own life and the life of her 
fetus, seems far less compelling than the state’s interest in the 
potential life that resides in the fetus. Unfortunately, until a 
tragic set of events occur causing a case of this nature to be 
heard by the Supreme Court, these questions will remain 
unanswered.  
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